In the case of economic sanctions, coercive measures aim to inhibit a country’s revenue by restricting trade and cutting off access to capital. They can be applied to entire states or, as is more common, individuals and groups. Among other forms, they include export restrictions, asset freezes, travel bans, arms embargoes and financial transaction controls. Sanctions are a popular instrument of statecraft. They are used in a wide variety of contexts, from the repression of anti-government protesters in South Africa to the severing of Russian gas supplies to Europe. Typically, they are seen as a ‘better’ alternative to military intervention. However, the link between sanctioning countries’ interests and their impact on the target country is not always straightforward.
In fact, the preoccupation with sanctions can obscure important considerations about why they work and why they fail. Sanctions can create a range of unintended effects, including heightened uncertainty and turbulence in global markets and new vulnerabilities for the target economy. They may also become entrenched, with domestic groups developing vested interests in maintaining them. For example, the US sugar manufacturers who lobbied to maintain the Soviet-era Cuban embargo saw that it insulated them from competition from more efficient Cuban producers.
Moreover, the effectiveness of sanctions can be overstated, as black market prices undermine them and neighbouring countries can suffer disproportionately. This can lead to a perception that sanctions are imperialistic, a claim which is hard to dispel given the high-profile nature of the practice. Nonetheless, when used with caution, economic sanctions are an effective instrument of influence. They can help to bring about change when political leaders are receptive to international pressure.